ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose the distributionally robust secure transmit schemes in multi-input single-output (MISO) downlink wireless networks which consist of a transmitter, a desired receiver, multiple eavesdroppers and an assisting jammer. The imperfect channel state information (CSI) is considered and the CSI errors are only captured by the mean and covariance. We first study the transmit power minimization by jointly designing the beamforming vector at transmitter and artificial noise(AN) covariance at jammer, while the lower bound of connection probability at desired receiver and lower bound of outage probability at eavesdroppers are guaranteed simultaneously. Since the chance-constrained problem is non-convex, we derive two safe convex approximations by exploiting the Conditional Value-at-risk (CVaR) based method and Bernstein-type inequality (BTiE) based method, respectively. Specifically, we extend the application of BTiE originally proposed with the Gaussianity assumption to other possible distributions which satisfy the proposed sufficient condition. Furthermore, the secrecy rate maximization is exploited under the constraint of total transmit power. The original problem is non-convex and fractional, hence we design the Bilevel Quick Search (BQS) method to make it tractable. Finally, the simulation results verify the effectiveness and the robustness of the proposed transmit schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION A. BACKGROUND
Communication security of wireless networks has gained much attention due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium. As a promising technique, the physical layer security (PLS) has recently aroused an upsurge of interest. Different from the cryptographic method, this technique has been developed based on information-theoretic concepts [1] . Considering the imperfections introduced by the channel, the secrecy capacity was studied in [2] . Reference [3] extended the work by exploiting the transmission of secret messages over broadcast channel.
Multi-antenna transmission has been exploited for security concerns due to the additional spatial degrees of freedom [4] - [6] . References [7] and [8] studied the secrecy capacity for multiple-input single-output (MISO) and multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems, respectively. In order to schemes using opportunistic method. In [18] , [19] , the transmission security is improved through wirelessly charged jammers. References [20] and [21] analyzed the performance gain by using assisting jammers in sensor networks.
Generally, the channel state information (CSI) plays an important role in secure transmit schemes design. Unfortunately, the CSI estimation errors are usually unavoidable in practice. There are mainly two ways describing the CSI errors: the deterministic and the stochastic models. In the former model, the CSI errors are assumed to lie in known sets of possible values. References [22] and [23] considered MISO downlink channel with imperfect CSI and addressed optimal transmit covariance for secrecy-rate maximization. In [24] , the robust beamforming was designed with worst case signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) constraints at legitimate receiver and eavesdroppers for MISO networks. Actually, it is not easy to determine the accurate sets of CSI errors. Meanwhile, the worst cases in deterministic model hardly happen which will lead to excessively conservative transmit strategies. For the stochastic model, CSI errors are considered as random variables satisfying certain distribution. Assuming CSI errors with Gaussian distribution, a robust beamforming scheme was proposed for MISO secrecy channel in the presence of multi-antenna eavesdroppers [25] . In [26] , simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) system was studied and the design object was summarized as a chance-constrained optimization problem.
B. RELATED WORKS AND MOTIVATION
In practice, the CSI errors may not submit Gaussian distribution and it is usually costly to get the accurate distribution information [27] , [28] . An alternative method is to obtain the statistical characteristics by observation or experience. So far, few works have concentrated on robust secure transmit scheme design based on the statistical characteristics of CSI errors. In order to highlight the novelty of this paper, it is worthy to emphasize the following differences between this paper and existing works.
• Firstly, the assisting jamming was employed in [14] - [17] to improve the secrecy performance, but the CSI errors were not considered therein. The robust transmit scheme was designed in [13] , where the CSI errors were described using the deterministic model. Although the stochastic model was taken in [25] , [26] , [29] , [30] , only the Gaussian distribution of the CSI errors was involved. In this paper, we extend the existing works and design the robust transmit schemes only based on the statistical characteristics of CSI errors.
• Secondly, there have been some recent works on robust optimization dealing with the statistical characteristics of CSI errors in wireless communication [28] , [31] - [33] . For example, in [28] , a distributionally robust sub-optimal linear receiver was designed for multi-access space-time block coded systems.
In [31] , the distributionally robust transmit schemes was proposed for the MISO downlink networks. However, the security problem was not considered in these works. In this paper, we investigate the distributionally robust secure transmission based on the PLS technique.
• Thirdly, leveraging the Lagrangian duality theory, a distributionally robust transmit scheme was proposed for the full-duplex bidirectional secure communication in [27] . Reference [34] extended this work by employing the assisting jamming. However, the Lagrangian duality theory based method becomes ultra-conservative when the statistical characteristics of CSI errors are accurate, which leads to extra power consumption. In view of this, the power-efficient distributionally robust transmit schemes are proposed in this paper.
C. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, utilizing the mean and covariance information of CSI errors, we study the distributionally robust secure transmit schemes in MISO downlink networks in the presence of single-antenna eavesdroppers. The multi-antenna assisting jammer is introduced to improve the secrecy performance. Both the transmit power minimization and secrecy rate maximization problems are investigated in this paper. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
• Considering the imperfect CSI, we propose the distributionally robust transmit schemes with the objective to minimize the total transmit power of transmitter and jammer subject to the reliability and security constraints, i.e., lower bound of connection probability at desired receiver and lower bound of outage probability at eavesdroppers. Unlike the state-of-the-art Gaussianity assumption in [25] , [26] , [29] , [30] , only the mean and the covariance of CSI errors can be obtained. The proposed transmit schemes show robustness against the possible CSI errors in despite of the distribution.
• As the chance-constrained power minimization problem is non-convex, we transfer it into tractable linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) using two different mathematical tools, i.e., the Conditional Value-at-risk (CVaR) [35] and Bernstein-type inequality (BTiE) [36] , respectively. The semidefinite relaxation (SDR) is employed to make the approximations in LMIs tractable and the rank-one property of the optimal solutions is also derived, which implies that the SDR is tight. Simulation results show that the CVaR based method is more reliable and secure, while the BTiE based method is more power-efficient.
• The BTiE was initially proposed with the Gaussianity assumption. We extend this mathematical tool to other possible distributions which satisfy the proposed sufficient condition in this paper. With this conclusion, the robust transmit scheme can also be designed based on the mean and the covariance of CSI errors. The extension of BTiE based method is certified mathematically and confirmed by simulations.
• When the total transmit power is fixed, the distributionally robust transmit schemes are also exploited to maximize the secrecy rate. The original problem is fractional and non-convex, hence we design the Bilevel Quick Search (BQS) method. Based on the solution of aforementioned power minimization optimization, the BQS actually takes nested iterative manner. As a result, the transformed problem is tractable and can be effectively solved. The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II introduces the system model and establishes the problem formulation. We solve the robust transmit power minimization problem in Section III, while deliver solutions to the secrecy rate maximization in Section IV. The simulation results and analysis are shown in Section V. The conclusion is drawn in Section VI.
The notation of this paper is as follows. Boldface lowercase and uppercase letters are used to denote vectors and matrices, respectively. I n denotes the n−by − n identity matrix, and 0 is a zero matrix. By X 0, we mean that X is a Hermitian positive semidefinite matrix. The operators (·) T , (·) H , Tr(·) and | · | represent the transpose, Hermitian, trace and determinant operations, respectively. R m×n and C m×n stand for the set of matrices with real-and complex-valued entries. The symbol E{·} represents the statistical expectation of the argument and
The Euclidean norm is denoted by || · || and Re{·} represents the real part of a complex value.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider downlink networks with a transmitter, a desired receiver and an assisting jammer in the presence of K eavesdroppers (Eves). The receiver and Eves are equipped with single antenna, while the antenna numbers of transmitter and jammer are N t and N j , respectively. The transmitter sends confidential messages to receiver under the protection of the AN generated by the assisting jammer. The limited communication is established between transmitter and the jammer, i.e., only the CSI and synchronization information can be transmitted between them. Meanwhile, the Eves try to tap the confidential messages in a passive way without collusion. The scenario is described in Fig. 1 . The signal sent by the transmitter is x = ws. s ∈ C denotes the data stream for the receiver with E{|s| 2 } = 1 and w ∈ C N t ×1 represents the beamforming vector. v ∈ C N j ×1 is AN generated by the assisting jammer with v ∼ CN (0, Q v ). Let h 0 ∈ C N t and h k ∈ C N t , k ∈ {1, . . . K } represent the channel gains from the transmitter to the receiver and Eve k, respectively. g 0 ∈ C N j and g k ∈ C N j , k ∈ {1, . . . K } represent channel gains from the jammer to the receiver and Eve k, respectively. The received signals at the receiver and Eve k can be denoted as
where n r ∈ C and n k ∈ C are independent and identical distributed (i.i.d.) circular symmetric complex additive white Gaussian noises with variances σ r 2 and σ k 2 . In this paper, we consider the imperfect CSI. The channel gains from transmitter to receiver and Eves can be represented as
whereĥ i ∈ C N t ×1 is the estimated channel gain and h i ∈ C N t ×1 denotes the corresponding CSI errors. Traditionally, it is simply assumed that h i submits complex Gaussian distribution. In this paper, we put it more general and practical by supposing that only the mean and covariance of CSI errors can be obtained. Assuming h i submits arbitrarily continuous distribution with mean ξ hi and covariance hi , i.e.,
where D(ξ hi , hi ) represents the set of distributions with the same mean and covariance. Similarly, channel gains from the assisting jammer to receiver and Eves are
denoting the estimated channel and
representing the CSI errors. The mean and covariance of g i are ξ gi and gi , respectively. Similarly, it can be denoted as
Considering the CSI errors and the existence of K Eves, the secrecy rate is defined as [3] C s = log 2 [ 
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we investigate the robust transmit power minimization and secrecy rate maximization problems. Considering the probabilistic CSI errors, the lower bound of connection probability at desired receiver and lower bound of outage probability at Eves are guaranteed in the optimization problems. By defining that
the transmit power minimization can be formulated as shown in (7), at the top of the next page. In (7), R 0 and R k are the preset achievable rate threshold of main channel and wiretap channel, respectively. p 0 and p k are the preset probability threshold. The constraint (7b) ensures the transmission reliability, while (7c), as shown at the top of the next page, guarantees security. To obtain available secrecy capacity, is should be satisfied that R 0 R k , k ∈ {1, . . . , K }. The secrecy rate maximization is defined as shown in (8), at the top of the next page. In (8), P max denotes the maximum total transmit power of the transmitter and the assisting jammer. In this way, the maximum secrecy rate can be achieved subject to secrecy outage probability
III. ROBUST TRANSMIT POWER MINIMIZATION
In this section, we will solve problem Q P which is non-convex for the chance constraints. The CVaR based method and BTiE based method are derived to get safe approximations of Q P , respectively.
A. CVAR BASED METHOD
The main obstacle to solve Q P lies in (7b) and (7c), which actually contain infinite constraints. For the chance constraints, the CVaR is applied as the tight convex approximation [37] . In this part, we employ the CVaR to convert these non-convex chance constraints into tractable forms.
Setting λ 0 =2 R 0 , the left hand of (7b) can be rewritten as (9) , shown at the top of the next page. And we have
where W = ww H . Introduce the error vector
. . , K } with mean and covariance
Combining (9) and (10), it can be obtained inf
where (11) contains infinite constraints for the probabilistic error vector. To tackle it, the following lemmas are introduced. Lemma 1 [38] : Let f : C N ×1 → R be a continuous function. Suppose that f (η) is either concave or (possibly non-concave) quadratic in η. Then the following equivalence holds
where 0 < ε < 1 and CVaR ε (f (η)) is the Conditional Valueat-Risk functional given by
Due to f l 0 ( l 0 ) is quadratic in l 0 , we invoke Lemma 1 to obtain
with ε 0 = 1 − p 0 . (14) can be further transferred into a semidefinite program (SDP) according the following lemma. Lemma 2 [38] : Let f : C N ×1 → R be a measurable function, and define the worst-case expectation θ wc as
then,
where = +µµ H µ µ H 1 , µ and are mean and covariance of η, respectively. Based on Lemma 2, sup
(15b)
Finally, the constraint (7b) is transferred into
Similarly, (7c) is transferred into
where
Therefore, the safe approximation of Q P is represented as
By relaxing the rank constraint, Q P−C is convex in LMIs form and can be solved efficiently (e.g. with CVX software [39] ). Although the rank-one constraint is relaxed, the following theorem reveals that the accurate solution of Q P−C still can be obtained. Theorem 1: If problem Q P−C without the rank constraint is feasible, then the optimal solution W * yields rank(W * ) = 1.
The proof is shown in Appendix A.
B. BTIE BASED METHOD
In [25] , [26] , the BTiE was employed based on the Gaussianity assumption for the CSI errors. This inequality is shown in the following lemma.
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Lemma 3 (Bernstein-Type Inequality [36] ): For any A, u, c, where A ∈ C N ×N is a complex Hermitian matrix, u ∈ C N ×1 , x ∼ CN (0, I N ) and ρ ∈ (0, 1], the following inequalities hold:
where w and y are slack variables, and y ≥ 0. As Lemma 3 implies, the inequality holds when it is satisfied that x ∼ CN (0, I N ). Due to Lemma 3 is a conservative conclusion, we generalize the BTiE inequality for other possible distributions of x. The following proposition gives the sufficient condition.
Proposition 1: For random vector x = [x 1 , . . . , x N ] T , the elements of which submit zero mean independent distribution, (20) 
is the moment generating function (MGF) of variable x k and m n 0 (t) is the MGF of standard normal distribution.
The proof is shown in Appendix B. 
Considering the CSI errors
To employ BTiE, we further transfer (21) as (22), shown at the bottom of the next page.
Suppose m e h0 (t) ≤ m n 0 (t) and m e g0 (t) ≤ m n 0 (t), where m e h0 (t) and m e g0 (t) represent MGF of e h0 and e g0 , respectively. According to Proposition 1, we can get
Following the same approach, the constraint (7c) is approximated by
Hence, we get the safe approximate of problem Q P based on BTiE as
By relaxing the rank-constraint rank(W) = 1, problem Q P−B is tractable and the solution is also optimal according to the following theorem.
Theorem 2: If problem Q P−B without the rank constraint is feasible, then the optimal solution W * yields rank(W * ) = 1.
The proof is shown in Appendix C.
Complex Analysis: Problem Q P−C and Q P−B are SDP and can be solved using interior-point method with the worst-case complexity of O(n 3.5 ) log(1/ε), where n denotes the number of optimization variables and ε denotes the given solution accuracy [40] . Thus, the computational complexity of CVaR based method is about 
IV. ROBUST SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION
With the safe solutions of Q P obtained in previous section, we begin getting approach to the secrecy rate maximization Q R in (8).
Setting that λ 0 = 2 R 0 , λ 1 = 2 R e , problem Q R can be transformed into Q R−F (see (26) , as shown at the bottom of this page).
Problem Q R−F is non-convex with the fractional expression in the objective function. To overcome it, we design an iterative algorithm based on the BQS. The BQS is actually a nested manner which can be divided into the inner problem and outer problem. For the inner problem, we calculate the maximum feasible λ 0 with fixed λ 1 . Let H (λ 1 ) denotes the optimal solution of the inner problem. Hence, the inner problem can be formulated as
Then the outer problem is to find the optimal λ 1 for maximizing the objective function of Q R−F , which can be equivalently solved by
λ 0 up and λ 1 up denote the upper bound of λ 0 and λ 1 , which are described in the following.
Considering an ideal scenario without Eves in which all transmit power is assigned to the transmitter, the upper bound λ 0 up is obtained by maximizing achievable transmit rate. Using CVaR based method, the corresponding problem can be written as 
10:
Solve the problem Q P−C (or Q P−B ) with R 0 , R k , p 0 , p k to obtain the minimum transmit power P in and the corresponding optimal W * , Q z * .
12:
If P in > P max , set λ 0 up = λ 0 ; else set λ 0 low = λ 0 .
13: end while 14 : 
FIGURE 2. Average minimum total transmit power versus required achievable rate threshold R 0 at the receiver.
The BTiE based method yields λ 0 up by
Then the initial upper bound λ 1 up can be obtained using the optimal solution W * of Q FC0 (or Q FB0 ) without considering the CSI errors and assisting jamming, i.e.,
To solve the inner problem, the bisection search [41] can be used with the safe solutions of Q P . Meanwhile, the outer problem can be handled by the exhaustive search such as golden section search [42] .
The algorithm for robust secrecy rate maximization based on BQS is summarized in Algorithm 1.
It should be noted that the optimal W * of Algorithm 1 also satisfies rank(W * ) = 1, since it is obtained based on the problem Q P−C or Q P−B . In addition, the BQS actually converges to the sub-optimization solution [44] .
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, the numerical results are provided to validate the proposed transmit schemes. We consider the wireless networks shown in Fig. 1 with three Eves (K = 3). The following simulation settings are assumed, unless otherwise specified: the channel realizations are i.i.d. complex Gaussian distributed with zero mean and unite variance; the background noise power is assumed σ r = σ 1 = σ 2 = σ 3 = 0dB; the achievable rate threshold at the Eves is R 1 = R 2 = R 3 = 1bit/s/Hz; the antenna numbers of transmitter and jammer are N t = N j = 8; the lower bounds of connection probability at the receiver and outage probability at Eves are p 0 = p 1 = p 2 = p 3 = 0.9. For comparison, we introduce the following schemes.
• The optimal transmit scheme with accurate CSI (noR) [43] .
• Distributionally robust transmit scheme based on Lagrangian duality theory (LD) [27] .
• Distributionally robust transmit scheme based on Lagrangian duality theory with assisting jamming (LD-AJ) [34] . For the robust transmit power minimization Q P , we examine the performance of CVaR based method (CVaR) and BTiE based method (BTiE), respectively. For simplicity, it is set ξ ηi = 0 and ηi = σ 2 I for η ∈ {h, g}, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and σ 2 ∈ {0.002, 0.004}. Fig. 2 shows the average minimum total transmit power versus achievable rate threshold at receiver R 0 for different designs. It indicates that the BTiE performs closely to the noR scheme although considering the CSI errors. Hence, the BTiE is shown as a highly tight approximate method. Compared with the BTiE, the CVaR consumes at least 4dB more transmit power when σ 2 =0.002 and 9dB more power when σ 2 =0.004. This is because an enhanced constraint has been implicitly imposed on (17a) and (18a) in the derivation of CVaR, while the BTiE contains no this kind of constraints. It can be found that larger variance requires more transmit power to deal with the enlarged CSI errors. We also inspect the security performance of the LD and LD-AJ schemes with σ 2 =0.002. The LD scheme cannot guarantee feasible solutions for high R 0 . In fact, when R 0 ≥ 3.5 bit/s/Hz, more than 60% channel realizations will become infeasible. Employing the assisting jamming, the LD-AJ scheme gets more feasible, but the LD-AJ is shown ultra-conservative when the statistical characteristics of CSI errors are accurate. Compared with the CVaR and BTiE, the performance gap is at least about 2dB and 8dB, respectively.
Next, we set σ 2 =0.002, R 0 = 5bit/s/Hz and p 0 = p 1 = p 2 = p 3 = p. Fig. 3 depicts average minimum total transmit power versus probability threshold p for the CVaR and BTiE with different antenna number. It is reasonable that improving the reliability and security of the network requires more transmit power. The result also shows that the CVaR consumes more power than BTiE under the same constraints. It indicates that the BTiE is less sensitive to the growth of p, which verifies the tightness of the BTiE. In addition, we can find that increasing the antenna numbers of transmitter and jammer is helpful for saving total transmit power. This is because that more transmit antennas provide more spatial degrees of freedom for beamforming designing.
For simplicity, the covariance of the CSI errors is set as ηi = σ 2 I for η ∈ {h, g}, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. In Fig. 4 , the feasibility rate versus σ 2 of the CVaR and BTiE is compared based on 10 5 channel realizations. It is set R 0 = 5bit/s/Hz. Both the CVaR and BTiE are used as the safe approximations of the problem Q p . It can be found that the security performance of the two method decreases with σ 2 , as larger σ 2 reduces the feasible region for beamforming. The CVaR is shown to require more transmit power for transmit schemes design in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 . However, the simulation results in Fig. 4 demonstrate that the CVaR is more feasible than the BIiE, e.g., the performance gap is at most about 35% when σ 2 = 0.008. Next, we test the reliability and security of the proposed CVaR and BTiE schemes as well as the noR design. Fig. 5 shows the histograms of the achievable rate at receiver and Eves. The required rate is set as R 0 = 5bit/s/Hz and
For each channel realization, we design the transmit schemes, then generate random error vectors and test the performance at each node. Among these three Eves, the maximum achievable rate is found and denoted as r e . The achievable rate at receiver is denoted as r 0 . To describe the CSI errors, we introduce the zero mean Gaussian, Uniform, Pareto distribution with σ 2 =0.002 and Laplace distribution with σ 2 =0.002 × 0.89 for satisfying propositon 1. Table 1 shows the proportion of channel realizations satisfying the reliability or security requirement. Among the three transmit schemes, the noR design cannot meet the requirements for all of these distributions, whereas the CVaR and BTiE can guanrantee the reliability and security simultaneously. It can be found that the CVaR is more conservative than the BTiE with higher legitimate receiving rate and lower eavesdropping rate. In addition, CVaR scheme is suitable for all continuous distributions without restrictions in propositon 1. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show the performance of Algorithm 1 for the robust secrecy rate maximization problem Q R with σ 2 =0.002. We first investigate the convergence of Algorithm 1, which has been proved theoretically in [44] . In Fig. 6 , four different channel realizations are provided with total transmit power constraint P max = 5dB. For both CVaR and BTiE schemes, the achievable secrecy rate increases monotonously with iteration number and converges to stationary values. It also can be noticed that for the same channel, the BTiE can lead to higher secrecy rate. Fig. 7 provides further insight for performance comparison by showing the average achievable secrecy rate versus total transmit power. It reveals that the BTiE is close to the noR scheme, and the gap between BTiE and CVaR is a at least 1.8bit/s/Hz. This is a result of stronger conservatism of the CVaR. Both the CVaR and BTiE show better security performance compared with the LD and LD-AJ schemes. The performance gap increases with the total transmit power, which verifies the superiority of the approximation methods.
Based on the simulation results, it can be concluded that both the CVaR and BTiE can guarantee the distributionally robust secure transmission. The CVaR is more reliable and secure for transmission, and it is shown that the CVaR is a more feasible scheme. But the BTiE is more power-efficient with less computational complexity, hence this scheme can lead to less power consumption for the transmit power minimization and larger secrecy rate for the secrecy rate maximization.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the distributionally robust secrecy transmission in MISO downlink networks with CSI errors. We first investigated the transmit power minimization which is non-convex for the chance constraints. To tackle it, two safe approximation methods have been proposed, i.e., the CVaR and BTiE based method. For the BTiE, the sufficient condition has been derived for other possible CSI errors distributions beyond the Gaussian type. Besides, the rank-one property of the optimal SDR solutions for the two proposed
schemes is provided. Furthermore, the secrecy rate maximization is also presented by designing the BQS method, which is an iterative algorithm based on the solution of power minimization. Simulation results have been provided to demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed schemes considering probabilistic CSI errors. It is validated that the CVaR method is more feasible and conservative in reliability and security, while the BTiE method shows the superiority in power saving.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We rewrite (19) for detail as
The Lagrangian of (32) is expressed as (33) , shown at the top of this page. In (33) , it is set η= [η 0 , η 1 , . . . , η K ],
{M}, β} and η, {E}, {H}, G 1 , G 2 are the dual variables for the constraints in (32) .
Suppose that γ * = η * , {E * }, {H * }, G 1 * , G 2 * , {M * }, β * is the optimal solution of (32), then (33) can be expressed as
In addition, we can obtain (35) and (36) as shown at the top of the next page. Substituting (35) (36) into (34), after some mathematical transformation, it can be obtained
where the symbols and χ are denoted as (38) and (39), shown at the top of the next page.
Next, we prove rank(W * ) = 1 by contradiction. Assuming that the optimal solution of (32) rank(W * ) = J , (J ≥ 2), it can be obtained W * = J j=1 ν j a j a j H where ν j and a j are the jth non-zero eigenvalue and associated eigenvector of W * . Set
Since (37) is solvable and bounded, we can get 0. Therefore, it can be obtained that
The result is contrary to the optimality of W * . So, it is proved that rank(W * ) = 1. Then, the theorem 1 is proved.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We first prove the following Lemma.
To prove Lemma 4, we calculate the difference
Lemma 4 is proved. Based on Lemma 4, for Tr ( 
According to [45] 
Similar to the contradiction approach in Appendix A, since 0, it can be proved that rank(W * ) = 1. Then, the theorem 2 is proved.
